The Arabic language : a Latin of modernity? by Kamusella, Tomasz Dominik
The Arabic Language: A Latin of Modernity?
Tomasz Kamusella
University of St Andrews
Abstract
Standard Arabic is directly derived from the language of the Quran. The Ara-
bic language of the holy book of Islam is seen as the prescriptive benchmark of 
correctness for the use and standardization of Arabic. As such, this standard 
language is removed from the vernaculars over a millennium years, which 
Arabic-speakers employ nowadays in everyday life. Furthermore, standard 
Arabic is used for written purposes but very rarely spoken, which implies that 
there are no native speakers of this language. As a result, no speech com-
munity of standard Arabic exists. Depending on the region or state, Arabs 
(understood here as Arabic speakers) belong to over 20 different vernacular 
speech communities centered around Arabic dialects. This feature is unique 
among the so-called “large languages” of the modern world. However, from a 
historical perspective, it can be likened to the functioning of Latin as the sole 
(written) language in Western Europe until the Reformation and in Central 
Europe until the mid-19th century. After the seventh to ninth century, there 
was no Latin-speaking community, while in day-to-day life, people who em-
ployed Latin for written use spoke vernaculars. Afterward these vernaculars 
replaced Latin in written use also, so that now each recognized European lan-
guage corresponds to a speech community. In future, faced with the demands 
of globalization, the diglossic nature of Arabic may yet yield a ternary poly-
glossia (triglossia): with the vernacular for everyday life; standard Arabic for 
formal texts, politics, and religion; and a western language (English, French, 
or Spanish) for science, business technology, and the perusal of belles-lettres.
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  I thank Peter Polak-Springer (Qatar University) and the three anonymous reviewers for their advice 
and useful suggestions.These corrections and suggestions for improvement are the more important, 
given the fact that I have no command of Arabic. Hence, necessarily, my reflection is based on second-
ary literature. This is the usual problem of large-scale comparisons through time and space. A scholar 
attempting such a feat is always bound to overlook some important details, because she or he will 
never be able to master all the skills and gather all the information to be able to deal adequately with 
each single nuance. Hopefully, other researchers interested in the subject may come to succor, correct-
ing errors, and misconceptions that may remain in this text for the sake of either improving such a 
comparison or falsifying it on the way to working out a better model for analyzing a phenomenon at 
hand. As mentioned in the article’s title, I propose that on the general plane the sociolinguistic situ-
ation of today’s Arabic-speakers is similar to that of the speakers of vernaculars who employed Latin 
for written purposes in medieval and early modern (western and central) Europe, usually prior to the 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. A reflection on such a comparison may usefully bring 
together for the sake of deepened dialog medievalists, sociolinguists, historians, neolatinists, arabists, 
sociologists, and political scientists, whose research paths would not have crossed otherwise. The al-
luded interdisciplinary dialog may yet yield a better understanding of both Europe’s Latin past and 
the Arabicphone present of the Middle East and North Africa.
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Introduction
The Arabic language is spoken by over 420 million people. It is an official 
language in 27 states, from Morocco and Mauritania in the west to Iraq in 
the east and from Tunisia and Syria in the north to Somalia and the Comoros 
in the south (Bobkova 2012; List of Countries 2017).1 The original Arabic 
speakers lived in the Arabian Peninsula. This Semitic language (kindred with 
Hebrew and Ethiopia’s Amharic) coalesced through the ideologically fortified 
literacy, which was endowed by the fact that the Quran was composed (or 
“revealed”) in Arabic at the beginning of the seventh century. Later, it became 
the holy book of the Islamic religion, contributing to the dogma that Arabic 
is the holy language, as spoken only by the religion’s true god. In this belief, 
Arabs and later Muslims of all ethnic origins joined the earlier Abrahamic 
(monotheistic Judeo-Christian) religions, which had typically defined the 
written language of their own holy books in this manner (Danecki 2000: 
9-21).
From Holy Language to Script to Modern Language
Jews saw the Hebrew of the Torah (Pentateuch) as god’s and the world’s original 
language. The Christians of the Eastern Roman Empire (“Byzantium”) 
accorded the same role to the Greek of the first century in which the New 
Testament was written. Their western counterparts (later, Catholics) who paid 
allegiance to the pope in Rome elevated the Roman Empire’s official language 
of Latin to this role, falling back on the early fifth-century official translation 
of the Bible into this language. Within the Eastern Roman Empire and in 
its sphere of political and cultural influence, subsequent translations of the 
Bible (as composed of the Hebrew and Aramaic books of the Old Testament 
and of the Greek New Testament) led to the emergence of subsequent holy 
languages, namely, Syriac (East Aramaic, second century) of the Syriac 
Church, Armenian (Grabar, early fifth century) of the Armenian Church, 
1 At present (2017), the Arab League has 22 members, namely, Algeria, Bahrain, Comores, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Arabic is also widely spo-
ken in Eritrea, which has an observer status in this organization. Last but not least, Arabic is a co-official 
language in Chad, Israel, and Tanzania (Zanzibar). Thus, in today’s world there are 22 Arab states and 
26 Arabicphone countries. Obviously, the tallies may vary again, if Maltese is treated as a variety of 
Arabic and the Sahrawi Republic (Western Sahara) is taken into consideration. In such a disposition, the 
former number would go up to 23 and the latter to 28 (List of Countries 2017; Member 2017).
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Georgian (late fifth century) of the Georgian Church, or (Old Church) 
Slavonic (late ninth century) of the Bulgarian and Rus’ Churches.
Importantly, all the aforementioned holy languages became complete with 
their own specific scripts, not shared by any other holy languages. In this 
way, by the shape of letters, the faithful of this or that religion or church 
could identify themselves or others. This symbolical function of scripts was of 
importance for maintaining clear lines of division among members of various 
faiths and churches in the situation of overwhelming illiteracy. The narrow 
stratum who read, wrote, and translated was composed of the top clergymen 
and scribes from rulers’ chanceries. But inscriptions in the holy script were 
meticulously chiseled on tombs and temple walls for all the faithful to see, 
remember, recognize, and identify them. Then, when they chanced upon 
a holy book, they could swiftly decide whether it was of their faith, or of 
another. Reverence and protection were only due to the former, while the 
latter had to be avoided or even destroyed.
The importance of religion as expressed through the script of a holy book is 
underscored by the fact that in the modern age, when numerous “vernaculars” 
(or un-holy languages) began to be employed for literary pursuits and book 
production, their users scribbled them in the script of their own holy book. 
As a result, Latin letters from the Latin translation of the Bible were used 
for writing English, Spanish, Croatian, German, or Hungarian. In the same 
way, Jews use the Hebrew script of the original Hebrew language of the Old 
Testament for writing Ivrit (Modern Hebrew), Yiddish, or Ladino (Spanyol); 
while Armenians employ the Armenian alphabet in the Armenian translation 
of the Bible, and they used it for writing Kipchak, Slavic, or Turkish until 
the turn of the 20th century. The Slavic Orthodox alphabet of Cyrillic – that 
stems from the Slavonic translation of the Bible – was adopted for writing 
Belarusian, Bulgarian, Russian, Serbian, or Ukrainian.
The spread of the use of holy scripts for writing other than holy languages 
(vernaculars) is connected to empires or diasporas. The initial spread of the 
Latin script took place across the Roman Empire, then Charlemagne’s Frankish 
Empire took over this role, and subsequently the Holy Roman Empire, before 
the modern colonial empires of Spain, Portugal, Britain, and France, spread 
the Latin alphabet around the world. The original extension of Cyrillic was 
connected to the medieval Bulgarian and Serbian empires, although shortly 
afterward (Kyivan) Rus’ introduced this alphabet to vast areas from the White 
Sea to Black Sea. In the modern times, it was the Russian and Soviet empires, 
which expanded the use of Cyrillic across northern Eurasia.
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Jews and Armenians migrated from their respective ethnic homelands in 
Palestine and eastern Anatolia. In diaspora, they adopted languages of their 
new environments, but infused them with words and phrases of their own 
liturgical-cum-ethnic languages. Thus, they produced specific Jewish and 
Armenian ethnolects of these languages, and when they chose to write them 
down, they did it invariably in their holy scripts of Hebrew and Armenian. 
Following the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Jewish Holocaust, 
the tradition of literacy in numerous Armenian and Jewish languages or 
ethnolects was wiped out. Due to these unprecedented calamities, both 
Armenians and Jews developed their enthnolinguistic national movements 
modeled on the examples from Central Europe, such as the German nation-
state founded in 1871 or the nation-states of Estonians, Hungarians, Poles, 
or Ukrainians established in the wake of the Great War. The success arrived 
with the establishment of the Jewish nation-state of Israel in 1948 and of the 
Armenian nation-state in 1991 after the break up of the Soviet Union. Hence, 
Ivrit written in the Hebrew script is the sole official and national language 
of the Jews and Armenian written in Armenian letters is the sole national 
language of the Armenians, meaning swift marginalization and exclusion of 
earlier Jewish and Armenian languages and ethnolects.
Currently, for all practical purposes, the holy-cum-secular language of 
Hebrew (Ivrit) is written with the use of the Hebrew script only, and similarly, 
the holy-cum-secular language of Armenian is written with the use of the 
Armenian letters only. This political decision required to construe all the 
recorded historical forms of Hebrew as a single language from the 10th century 
BCE through the 21st century and, similarly, various forms of Armenian 
in written use from the fifth century through the 21st century are seen as 
constituting a single language. A similar path, without the experience of 
empire or diaspora, was followed by other aforementioned holy languages that 
morphed into present-day (modern and secular) languages and thus upheld 
the unity of language and script. For example, the use of their respective script 
has been preserved (almost) exclusively for the language in question, and the 
various recorded historical forms of these languages have been construed as a 
single language of long and continuous history.
Therefore, the Syriac script is used for writing the liturgical language of 
Classical (Biblical) Syriac, in addition to the present-day language of Neo-
Aramaic (Modern Syriac), as used by the faithful of various Syriac Churches 
in eastern Turkey and Iraq. Similarly, Georgian letters are employed for 
writing the liturgical language of Georgian (or Old Georgian) and its modern 
varieties. The Georgian alphabet was employed for writing the Indo-European 
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language of Ossetian (spoken in Georgia’s break-away autonomous Republic 
of South Ossetia and Russia’s autonomous Republic of South Ossetia-Alania) 
between 1937 and 1954 in South Ossetia, while Cyrillic was used in North 
Ossetia. Afterward, Cyrillic was adopted for the entire Ossetian language in 
both Ossetias. Today, Laz of the very northeastern corner of Turkey speak a 
Kartvelian language that could be easily defined as “Georgian,” but for the 
fact that they are Muslims. Hence, they wrote their language in Arabic letters 
until 1928 when Turkey adopted the Latin script. Nowadays, as is the case of 
Pomaks or Aromanians in Greece, the ethnolinguistic and religious unity of 
Turkey is emphasized to the marginalization and (at times forced) assimilation 
of ethnolinguistically non-Turkic groups, such as the Laz.
The unity of script, language, nation, and state is also the case of Greek. The 
ancient (pre-Christian) written Greek variety or Koine (Common Attic) of 
the fourth century BCE, the (liturgical) Greek of the New Testament, the 
Medieval Greek of the East Roman (“Byzantine”) Empire (especially after 
the seventh century when Greek replaced Latin as the official language), and 
the Modern Greek are construed as a single language,  together with rarely 
committed to the page regional varieties (“dialects”) of Cypriot Greek and 
Pontic. All the diachronic and regional varieties are as different as, or even 
more so than, English and German or Russian and Polish. The factor that 
unites all the varieties is the same Greek script and Orthodox Christianity, 
which in turn is seen as the ideological pillar of the Greek nation and its 
nation-state of Greece. Hence, the complication of aspirationally federal, 
bilingual (Greek-Turkish), and bi-confessional (Orthodox and Muslim) 
Cyprus sits so uneasily with the mainstream of the Greek ethnolinguistic-
cum-ethnoreligious nationalism.
Obviously, Pontic or Cypriot (Greek) could have developed as separate 
languages written in the same Greek alphabet shared with the Greek 
language, but the users of Pontic and Cypriot decided against this possibility 
and have stuck to the idea of a single and indivisible Greek language. The 
diaspora of Greek-speakers that arose after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 
and the emergence of the Greek nation-state in 1821 yielded some Orthodox 
communities who spoke or adopted other languages but always wrote them 
down in Greek letters, for instance, Karamanli (Turkish) in Cappadocia 
(today’s central Turkey), Gagauz (present-day southern Moldova), in addition 
to Aromanian (Vlach Romance), Arvanitika (Tosk Albanian), or Pomak 
(Slavic) in present-day Greece. Karamanli was lost in the wake of the 1923 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey; Karamanli-speakers, 
dispersed across Greece, quickly adopted Greek as their language. In the 20th 
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century, the Gagauzes’ homeland changed hands between Russia, Romania, 
the Soviet Union, and Moldova, which entailed a series of imposed or 
ideologized script switches to the Latin alphabet, the Greek script, Cyrillic, 
and then back to the Latin letters. In Greece itself, the use of the Greek script-
based Aromanian, Arvanatika, and Pomak is discouraged in the name of the 
political, ethnolinguistic, scriptural, and religious unity of the Greek nation.
Modern Greek is still a complicated story in its own right. During the Greek 
Revolution (1821–1831) that produced the Modern Greek nation-state, 
at the turn of the 19th century, early Greek nationalists under the Western 
(European) influence had conceived a Katharevousa (“purifying [language]”). 
It was a compromise variety between Ancient and New Testament Greek 
on the one hand and Demotic (present-day vernacular Greek) on the other. 
Katharevousa remained official language in Greece until 1976, when Demotic 
finally replaced it in the wake of the fall of the military junta (1974), this event 
paved the way for democracy in this country. These two varieties of Modern 
Greek, Katharevousa and Demotic, map the main political cleavage in Greek 
society, namely, between the conservative right and the pro-democratic left. 
Until today, the Greek Orthodox Church prefers to use Katharevousa for 
written purposes. However, when it comes to liturgy, the New Testament 
Greek is the sole acceptable standard language variety. This became obvious 
when a Demotic translation of the New Testament Greek original of the 
Gospel of St Matthew was published in an Athens newspaper in 1901. This 
publishing event led to widespread violent riots, because this translation was 
seen as both “anti-religious” and “anti-national.”
Cesaropapism and Diglossia
Where does the case of the Arabic language fit the story? The United States 
linguist Charles A. Ferguson’s (1921–1989) main claim to fame is his work 
on diglossia, which introduced this term to the anglophone academia, and 
made the phenomenon described by this concept better known among social 
scientists. Ferguson’s article “Diglossia” that appeared in the renowned journal 
Word in 1959 drew at examples from the Arabic-speaking world. Diglossia 
denotes a situation wherein all or many members of a speech community or 
this community’s elite employ two or more conspicuously different varieties 
of a language in clearly delineated separate spheres of (social and political) 
life. In the case of the Arabic world, these spheres are, namely, everyday life 
(family, neighborhood, market, and workplace), the religious context (liturgy 
and prayers), and the official use of language (publications, administration, 
and official speeches).
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The unity of the holy language of the Quran with its script is underpinned 
by the strong normative insistence among Islam’s faithful that religion and 
politics are inseparable (Al-Jabiri 2009: 32-33; Lewis 1988: 2).2 This doctrine, 
known as cesaropapism in Western political thought, proposes that the 
political leader of a polity should also act as a polity’s spiritual leader. This was 
the politico-confessional norm in the East Roman Empire, from where the 
Arabs borrowed this model and modified for their own needs (cf Kościelniak 
2004). In Eastern Christianity, this standard persisted in the Russian 
Empire until its collapse in 1917 or in Montenegro, where the temporal ruler 
continued to act as a polity’s bishop until 1851. Even the current Constitution 
of Greece, which provides for the Western-style division of Church and State, 
nevertheless, in Article 3 states that “[t]he prevailing religion in Greece is that 
of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.” This pronouncement de facto 
makes Orthodox Christianity into the state-cum-national religion of the 
Greek nation-state, and the Greek Orthodox Church into the ideological basis 
of this polity. This ideological link between State and Church is based on the 
Church’s full control of liturgical (New Testament) Greek, as stipulated in 
Article 3.3: “The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. 
Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior 
sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of 
Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.” Well, the aforementioned 1901 
Gospel riots settled this question for now.
On the other hand, in Western Christianity, the separation of Church and 
State dates back to Charlemagne’s renewal of the (Western) Roman Empire in 
800. In this year, Pope Leo III crowned him as an Emperor. Henceforth, the 
sacred was the pope’s preserve, while the temporal was the emperor’s domain. 
This consensus was briefly disturbed during the wake of Reformation, when 
some Protestant rulers became heads of national churches in their respective 
polities. For instance, today, the British or Swedish monarchs being Heads 
of State also act as Ecclesiastical Heads of the Church of England and of the 
(Lutheran) Church of Sweden, respectively. But this Protestant cesaropapism 
is mitigated on several counts in comparison to its Greek or Eastern Roman 
counterpart. First, the Protestant monarch is a titular Head of State with no 
day-to-day power prerogatives, which are executed by the constitutionally 
elected government. Similarly, the everyday ecclesiastical business is ceded 
2 Obviously, this insistence on the inseparability of religion and politics is purely normative in its char-
acter. Under the influence of the west in the form of democracy, nationalism or communism, many 
Arab countries began separating state (politics) from religions since the early 20th century (Lane and 
Redissi 2009: 145-154). I thank Anonymous Reader 1 for the remark that this issue should be clarified 
in more detail.
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to the Primate, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury in England and the 
Archbishop of Uppsala in Sweden. None of the ecclesiasts has any formal 
control over the norms of the English or Swedish language, whereas nowadays 
the state religions do not limit the freedom of other religions in Britain and 
Sweden.
Significantly, during the 16th century, the Protestant Reformation and the 
Catholic Counter-Reformation resulted, among others, in an ideological 
consensus that the Bible may be legally translated into vernaculars. In this 
way, the previously elevated ecclesiastical-cum-secular position of the holy 
language of Latin was successfully usurped as Western Christianity’s sole 
official (written) language. Numerous vernaculars were shaped into official-
cum-national languages based on this model of Latin. Latin persisted as 
Western Christianity’s language of diplomacy and scholarship for a short 
period, but from the 17th to 19th centuries, French gradually replaced it between 
Portugal and Russia. What remains from the common Western Christian 
(Catholic and Protestant) legacy of Latin literacy is the Latin script for writing 
the post-Latin vernaculars. In Europe, this script is quite a reliable litmus test 
for ascertaining whether a given (national) speech community belongs or used 
to belong to the Western Christian community of Catholics and Protestants.
However, exceptions do occur as in the case of the Orthodox nation of 
Romanians, who switched from Cyrillic to the Latin script for writing their 
Romance(-Slavic) language of Romanian in the mid-1860s. The Moldovans 
followed suit in 1989, that is, two years before the break up of the Soviet Union, 
while the Moldovan language continues to be written in Cyrillic in Moldova’s 
breakaway territory of Transnistria under Russia’s control. Since the early 21st 
century, resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin’s rule employs the Cyrillic 
alphabet and Orthodox Christianity to claim the Slavophone nation-states 
of Belarus and Ukraine as Russia’s rightful sphere of cultural-cum-political 
influence. Thus, post-Soviet Russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence, known 
as the “near abroad” in the 1990s, morphed into the present-day slogan of the 
“Russian World” (Russkii Mir).
Arabic Diglossia: Between the Hijrah and the Internet
Cesaropapism in the Islamic world lasted until the early 1920s. The Sultan 
(“emperor”) of the Ottoman Empire acted as the Caliph (“pope”) of all the 
Muslims. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its transformation into 
the secular Republic of Turkey (1923) constituted the background for the 
abolishment of the sultanate in 1922, which two years later, in 1924, was 
followed by the phasing out of the caliphate. Since that moment, in the 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 1/5/18 4:08 PM
125
Tomasz Kamusella, The Arabic Language: A Latin of Modernity?
majority of Arabic and culturally Muslim states, rulers have been secular in 
their character, although most have adopted a plethora of religious attributes 
in their demeanor. Islam remains the most potent ideology of statehood 
legitimization and maintenance in the Islamic world. That is why in many 
Muslim and Arab countries sharia (Quranic religious law) actually constitutes 
these polities’ law. Although the King of Saudi Arabia brandishes the 
honorific title “the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (thus, announcing 
his protection over Islam’s two holiest cities of Mecca and Medina), he is not 
a religious leader in the sense of a caliph or the country’s most senior cleric. 
However, since 1972, the kingdom’s top ulema (Islamic clergymen) have been 
members of the Council of Senior Scholars who advise the King on religious 
and political matters. The only other Islamic country where religion and 
politics are even more tightly intertwined nowadays is Iran. After the 1979 
theocratic revolution, the country’s Supreme Leader is one of the very senior 
Shia clerics or ayatollahs. However, unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran is not an Arabic-
speaking country.
Although by and large cesaropapism disappeared from politics and state 
structures in the Arabicphone polities, the normative idea that politics is 
religion and both are inseparable remains strong at the level of day-to-day 
life and political mobilization. “Infidels” (or monotheistic non-Muslims) 
are often not allowed to enter mosques, or let alone the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina, which are strictly off limits to non-Muslims. Blasphemers 
are regularly prosecuted, imprisoned, and even targeted by self-righteous 
assassins. Stating publicly that one does not believe in any god(s) is dangerous 
in extremis, because from an observant Muslim’s point of view, atheists – 
known as kafirs (“pagans” or “unbelievers”) – are worse than infidels. 
Although, under sharia, members of other monotheist religions enjoy 
protection in Islamic states, usually they need to keep a low profile in order 
to avoid persecution. Furthermore, in the context of the bitter 70-year-old 
Jewish–Palestinian conflict over Israel/Palestine, this sharia-based protection 
of Judaists is frequently observed in breach.
At the level of language and everyday communication, the continuing 
intertwining of religion and politics in the Arab countries is reflected in 
persistent diglossia. The Arabic language employed in writing is known in 
technical linguistic vocabulary under the sobriquet of Modern Standard 
Arabic. However, users considered this standard language as directly 
stemming from the holy language of the Quran, which is accorded as the 
highest normative authority. It is usually (Western) linguists who classify the 
Classical Arabic of this holy book and Modern Standard Arabic as separate 
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varieties or languages. The latter emerged in the course of the employment of 
the former seventh-century language for the sake of governance, literature, 
science, and technology in the intervening centuries when numerous political 
upheavals took place, and the phenomena also subsumed under the general 
name of modernization, which has unfolded during the past 200 years 
(Versteegh 2014: 60-84, 221-240).
Between the emergence of Islam and its rapid spread from Arabia to the 
Atlantic and today’s state of Indonesia, this standard language coalesced and 
acquired features that are different from the Classical Arabic language. The 
territorial decline of the Turkic3–Arabic Ottoman Empire under the pressure 
of the West and Russia from the late 18th to early 20th century triggered a 
variety of reform or “modernization” movements across the Arabic and Islamic 
world. One of these was a program of sponsored and grassroots translations 
(adaptations) of Western philosophical and scientific works, as well as 
literature, into Arabic in semi-independent Ottoman Egypt during the long 
19th century. These translations published in relatively large runs decisively 
shaped Modern Standard Arabic into what it is now. First, at the turn of the 
1830s, a theory of equivalence between French and Arabic was proposed. At 
that time, French was seen as the acme of civilization and the “universal and 
most logic” medium of “modernity” (or of how the political, social, cultural, 
technological, or economic relations were organized in the west, ensuring its 
domination over the rest of the world [cf Malik 2017: 56; Mommsen 1987: 
38]). It required quite a leap of faith to propose that Arabic could be French’s 
match. But such faith was not in short supply, as proposers of the idea also saw 
Arabic as the language of god, thus the world’s first-ever language conferred 
on humanity directly from the heavens. From this perspective, French had to 
be inferior to the holy language of the Quran. Subsequently, between 1854 
and 1873, numerous French works were translated into Arabic, shaping it 
into a modern language, or a member of the narrow circle of the languages 
of modernity (meaning media of book production, newspapers, technology 
and full-scale education from elementary school to university). After Egypt 
became a British protectorate in 1882, the process was yet repeated when 
numerous books were translated from English (Tageldin 2011).
Standard Arabic became infused with a variety linguistic loans, neologisms 
and calques from western languages, which obviously do not occur in 
3 I use the term “Turkic” rather than “Turkish” in order to describe the ethnolinguistic character of 
the Ottoman Empire because, apart from the Turkish-speakers in Anatolia and the empire’s official 
administrative Turkic language of Osmanlıca, this vast polity was also inhabited by speakers of some 
other Turkic vernaculars and languages, for instance, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz, Karamanli, or Türki 
(or today’s Azeri) (cf Danişmend 1935; Jankowski 2010; Zajączkowski 1966 and 1975).
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the Arabic of the Quran. But, today, in its structures and foundational 
vocabulary, standard Arabic remains a language that, for all practical reasons, 
has been removed from day-to-day speech in Arabicphone towns and villages 
for fourteen centuries. This diglossic gulf of difference between vernacular 
Arabic and the standard language is broader than that between Katharevousa 
and Demotic in the case of Greek prior to 1976, when the latter replaced 
the former as the country’s sole official language. Despite its Ancient and 
New Testament Greek core, Katharevousa was infused with some Demotic 
elements. It is not the case of standard Arabic, in which the normative ideal is 
to stick to the early seventh-century “purity” of the language of the Quran. If 
a vernacular element is found in one’s writing, it is a sign of the person’s low 
level of education, such that he cannot frame his thoughts in correct Arabic 
language. Even worse, it is a departure from the linguistic norm of “god’s own 
language,” almost a slide into unbelief. This negative branding of perceived 
“incorrectness” discourages many Arabic-speakers from using standard Arabic 
for perusal or for writing longer texts for public consumption.
Not only the language of current Arabic-speakers is different from the 
standard language on the temporal plane, but the number of regional varieties 
(dialects) of this language also proliferated and differences among them grew 
conspicuously in the course of the expansion of Arabic within the Islamic 
Caliphate from the Maghreb to Mesopotamia. As the rule of thumb, the 
more the two given varieties are distant from each other in the terms of 
space, the less mutually comprehensible they tend to be. Scholars distinguish 
about fifty varieties grouped in six conventional clusters, namely, Maghrebi, 
Egyptian, Sudanese, Peninsular (that is, of the Arab Peninsula), Levantine, 
and Mesopotamian. Nowadays, in the age of Arabicphone nation-states, this 
novel political reality has melded or torn asunder earlier regional varieties 
shaping them into more than twenty state-centered varieties (Behnstedt and 
Woidich 2005; Versteegh 2014: 192-220).
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The sheer range of these varieties, which could be easily construed as “six 
families” of twenty odd different languages,4 is largely invisible to Arabic-
speakers themselves and to the outside (non-Arabic-speaking) world. The 
former continue to disregard this reality on the ground and emphasize the 
singular nature of the Arabic language as the holy language of the Quran. 
On the other hand, non-Arabs (or more exactly, westerners) trust Arabs on 
that and see Arabic through the lens of their own – invariably – vernacular 
languages of the West that are both written and spoken in official situations 
and in everyday life. In the modern period, during the times of the Caliphate, 
the Ottoman Empire provided a political and religious unity for (almost) all 
the Arabs (Arabic-speaking Muslims). This unity was emphasized by the holy 
Arabic language and script of the Quran, to whom all paid allegiance from 
the lowly illiterate peasant to rulers and civil servants (literati). The illiterate 
peasant masses revered the language and its script as “sacred symbols” 
without any immediate need to be able to read or write, while the educated 
elite employed full-blown Arabic literacy for running the vast empire’s 
administration, armies, and court culture.
When this cesaropapal solution of the Ottoman Empire-cum-Caliphate 
unraveled in the early 1920s, it was gradually replaced with Arab nationalism, 
steeped in the Arabic language and script, and by the cultural commonality 
that stems from, and for that matter remains strongly connected to, Islam. 
Unlike Europe, where a given national movement aspired to establish for 
4 The international standard for the registration of all the world’s languages, ISO639-3, enumerates 
30 distinctive Arabic varieties or languages, each with its own registration code, nowadays popularly 
used for language recognition in the cyberspace. These varieties include Algerian Saharan Spoken 
Arabic [aao] (Algeria), Algerian Spoken Arabic [arq] (Algeria), Babalia Creole Arabic [bbz] (Chad), 
Baharna Spoken Arabic [abv] (Bahrain), Chadian Spoken Arabic [shu] (Chad), Cypriot Spoken Arabic 
[acy] (Cyprus), Dhofari Spoken Arabic [adf] (Oman), Eastern Egyptian Bedawi Spoken Arabic [avl] 
(Egypt), Egyptian Spoken Arabic [arz] (Egypt), Gulf Spoken Arabic [afb] (Kuwait), Hadrami Spoken 
Arabic [ayh] (Yemen), Hijazi Spoken Arabic [acw], Libyan Spoken Arabic [ayl] (Libya), Mesopota-
mian Spoken Arabic [acm] (Iraq), Moroccan Spoken Arabic [ary] (Morocco), Najdi Spoken Arabic 
[ars], North Levantine Spoken Arabic [apc] (Syria), North Mesopotamian Spoken Arabic [ayp] (Iraq), 
Omani Spoken Arabic [acx] (Oman), Sa’idi Spoken Arabic [aec] (Egypt), Sanaani Spoken Arabic 
[ayn] (Yemen), Shihhi Spoken Arabic [ssh] (United Arab Emirates), South Levantine Spoken Arabic 
[ajp] (Jordan), Standard Arabic [arb], Sudanese Creole Arabic [pga] (South Sudan), Sudanese Spo-
ken Arabic [apd] (Sudan), Ta’izzi-Adeni Spoken Arabic [acq] (Yemen), Tajiki Spoken Arabic [abh] 
(Tajikistan), Tunisian Spoken Arabic [aeb] (Tunisia), and Uzbeki Spoken Arabic [auz] (Uzbekistan). 
All of them are grouped together in the macrolanguage (inclusive) ISO639-3 code [ara] for the Arabic 
language (Arabic 2017). However, the Ethnologue’s linguistic classificatory scheme includes five more 
Arabic varieties, which were given separate codes, due to the fact that from the ethnic (ethnoreligious) 
point of view their speakers are not Arabs. In present-day Israel, some Jews speak Judeo-Iraqi Arabic 
[yhd], Judeo-Trpolitanian Arabic [yud], Judeo-Tunisian Arabic [ajt], and Judeo-Yemeni [jye], while 
Maltese [mlt] is Malta’s official and national language. Speakers of these ethnically non-Arabic variet-
ies typically do not practice diglossia with standard Arabic, but with Hebrew in Israel, and to a degree 
with English in Malta. Last but not least, recently a code was added for Hassaniyya Arabic [mey] 
spoken in Mauritania (Subgroups 2017; Update 2000).
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the postulated nation a separate nation-state, Arab nationalism normatively 
allows for a plethora of separate (regional) nation-states. The idea of uniting 
all Arabic-speaking areas into a single Arab nation-state was quite potent 
in the mid-20th century at the cusp of worldwide decolonization, but never 
led to a single stable union of any already established (usually postcolonial) 
Arab nation-states. The Arab language and the religiously defined cultural 
commonality (the two pillars of Arab nationalism, characterized by a dual 
ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious nature) appear to be quite a well-working 
functional replacement for the defunct Caliphate-cum-Empire as the unifier 
of the Arabicphone world at the beginning of the 21st century (Choueiri 2005: 
48-55, 82-100, 125-165).
To an Arab not educated about the use of standard Arabic, the language is 
anything but comprehensible. Earlier, for most people, it was sufficient to 
learn how to mouth the suras of the Quran, without the need to understand 
the actual meaning of the uttered words. The faithful oral recitation of 
appropriate verses from the holy book was sufficient. The religious tradition of 
learning the relatively correct pronunciation of the holy language is practiced 
among Judaists (Jews). Prayer books in Hebrew language are commonly 
published with phonetic notation above or below the verses in the holy 
language. This notation appears in smaller font in the script and spelling of 
the official language of a given state in which a target Jewish community 
resides. Hence, in France, such phonetic notation is given in Latin letters in 
accordance with the French-style spelling. On the other hand, in Russia, the 
script is Cyrillic, and orthography used for the aforementioned purpose is that 
of the Russian language. When in synagogue, irrespective of a country and 
the language in which they received education, the Judaist faithful can “read” 
aloud the Torah and prayers in this manner, it is adequate for participating in 
Judaist liturgy and rites, and allows for the appropriate observation of religious 
holidays. The voice of god as recited by mouthing the sacred book’s verses in 
the holy language of Biblical Hebrew is the only liturgical requirement placed 
on the faithful. This situation is similar among Muslims in using Arabic for 
religious purposes.
In the course of modernization, across the entire region of the Abrahamic 
religions, irrespective of how strong the normative hold of religion may still 
remain, the holy language of a sacred scripture was replaced by a vernacular 
either related or unrelated to the holy language. Some cases of such a last 
ditch of the language of a holy book in favor of a vernacular for everyday use 
occurred rather late, for instance, in the mid-20th century in the case of Jews 
and in the mid-1970s in the case of Greeks. In the late 1960s, the Catholic 
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Church also followed the example of its Protestant counterparts and replaced 
Latin with the faithful’s vernaculars (that would be an anathema to Orthodox 
Christians in Greece or Judaists to abandon liturgy in their holy languages) 
for liturgy. In this context, the Arabic-speaking core of the Islamic world is 
the only case where the holy language became a language of modernity to the 
exclusion of vernaculars. The six official languages of the United Nations are 
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, which are all languages 
of past or current empires. Among them, Arabic is the only holy language of 
some sacred scriptures. All other languages are vernaculars, meaning that they 
enjoy extensive speech communities with hundreds of millions of speakers 
who use them in everyday life. Standard Arabic was spoken in daily life over a 
millennium ago; nowadays, there is no speech community of Modern Standard 
Arabic. No one speaks it as their first (“native”) language, that is, as a vernacular.
Of course, highly educated Arab parents may decide to raise their children 
speaking standard Arabic alone. But unless the number of these parents is in 
the thousands and they live together in a same area (ideally, a state), there is no 
chance for any revival of Arabic as a “living language” of everyday conversation 
in a neighborhood. In the absence of such a situation, some parents wishing to 
make standard Arabic as the first language of their children are able to succeed, 
paradoxically, only if they reside in a non-Arabic-speaking country. Otherwise, 
the Arabic vernacular spoken in the streets by their children’s playmates would 
have frustrated their goal in no time. On the other hand, almost no parent 
would risk such an experiment that would isolate their children from their 
invariably vernacular-speaking kin and kith in the home country. The expat 
families usually visit their relatives on a regular basis, and their children are in 
touch with their grandparents and cousins, with the help of skype. This situation 
reinforces the use of a specific vernacular variety of Arabic in the expat families.
Literate Arabs read and write in standard Arabic. They deliver and listen to 
official speeches and university lectures in the same language. Every day, all and 
sundry hear standard Arabic steeped in Quranic recitations during prayers in 
mosque or when radio or television news are broadcast, where the anchor reads 
aloud the appropriate written texts. The same is true of the internet which is 
an intensely literate medium (despite the growing numbers of video materials 
available in Arabic vernaculars [cf Kindt and Kebede 2017]). But among the 
mass media, cinema, television and radio are the preserve of vernaculars. 
Almost one-fourth of Arabic speakers (over 90 million) speak the Egyptian 
Arabic vernacular, which enjoys a unique edge in the Arabicphone world. 
This edge is additionally sharpened by the fact that most films and television 
programs in Arabic are produced in Egypt. As a result, the Egyptian variety 
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is the vernacular of popular culture across the Arab world. This vernacular is 
popularly referred to as Masri, meaning “Egyptian.” In order to access and 
enjoy this attractive popular culture, speakers of other Arabic varieties acquire 
the Egyptian vernacular mostly in the unofficial context of consuming cultural 
products offered in this vernacular medium (Amin 1996: 109; Haeri 2003).
The huge gap of difference between standard Arabic and the vernaculars, 
although noticed and acted upon in communication practices of everyday life, 
does not inspire many to question the established sociolinguistic status quo. 
The normative hold of the Quran’s holy language is so overwhelming and so 
deeply ingrained that to most proposing that Arabs should start writing in 
vernacular would be akin to blasphemy (Danecki 2000: 24). Standard Arabic 
is intimately intertwined with politics and Islam, which makes it impossible to 
replace this language with a vernacular or rather a multiplicity of vernaculars. 
Arab nationalism also mitigates this possibility, negatively branding it as the 
“danger of disunity.” Arab nationalists are ready to concede to the political 
reality of separate (“regional”) Arab nation-states, but not to any break up of 
the “supra-state” Arabic language of the postulated “pan-state” Arab nation 
(Farah 1987; Suleiman 2003: 131-146). The example of the Maltese language 
does not convince either. Maltese-speakers have no problems in communicating 
with Arabs in Libya, because both Maltese and the Libyan vernaculars belong 
to the Maghrebi group of Arabic vernaculars. However, Maltese in graphic 
representation is pronouncedly un-Arabic and un-Islamic, because to writing 
this language, the “infidel script” of Latin letters is used (Brincat 2011).
Depending on a communication situation, numerous English (and some 
Italian) loanwords and expressions in Maltese are used, which add up to 5–20 
per cent of the language’s vocabulary. Non-Maltese words are used especially 
in the intellectual and technical registers of the Maltese language, while 
everyday circumstances may be discussed without such non-Maltese intrusions 
(cf Rosner and Joachimsen 2012: 52-53). Arabic vernaculars are similar to 
Maltese. When an Arab professional (for instance, an engineer or a medical 
doctor), instead of switching to English or French, discusses a technical issue, 
he (almost invariably a male) infuses the local vernacular with foreign words, 
usually drawn from French in Algeria or from English in Qatar.5 However, 
this professional would not even dream to write down his words verbatim in 
5 Anonymous Reader 1 rightly points out that this example is simplistic and some readers could even see it 
as “abusive.” Obviously, there are many female professionals (or women with university-level education) 
in Arab countries. However, there are disproportionately more male university graduates. At present, 
in some Gulf states, women graduates from universities slightly outnumber men, but the former tend 
to be underemployed, while the latter achieve positions of power in army or civil services, despite their 
relatively poorer education (cf Cadei 2015; Education 2014). However, the brevity of this article and its 
comparative goal do not allow for presenting a broader range of sociolinguistic situations. 
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the vernacular. If he finds it difficult to express in a text, an especially knotty 
point in standard Arabic, he can always resort to writing about it in English 
or in French. On the other hand, uneducated or poorly educated masses have 
no need for specialist language to delve into fine questions of technology, 
management, or science. The local vernacular is sufficient for navigating 
everyday circumstances. However, due to widespread work emigration to 
the West, many Arabic vernaculars acquired numerous English or French 
loanwords. This trend is reinforced by western popular culture increasingly 
available through radio, satellite television, and the internet.
Foreign western languages offer a level playing field to women for whom 
standard Arabic oftentimes entails a steep slope to climb, much steeper than 
it is in the case of men. In the traditionalist view, still prevalent in most Arab 
countries (that is, Arabicphone countries, where Arabic is the sole or main 
official language), education is earmarked for boys. Girls are to stay at home 
and get ready to become obedient housewives, whose main duty is to give birth 
to and raise children. Furthermore, women tend to be sequestered to their 
own female-only space at home, while the outside world tends to be the man’s 
preserve. When venturing outdoors, a pious woman must wear a head and face 
cover, and ideally a male relative should accompany her. In most Arab countries, 
active participation in modernity is reserved for men, although nowadays, in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, this traditionalist approach is challenged in some 
urban areas. A clear index of this gender gap is literacy. Illiteracy remains high 
for women in the Arab countries, although it dropped significantly from 65 per 
cent in 1980 to 40 per cent twenty years later. In the case of school-aged women 
in the age group of 15–24 years, the drop in illiteracy rate was steeper from 45 
to 19.5 per cent between 1980 and 2000 (Hammoud 2000: 20). In the most 
developed and one of the very richest Persian Gulf states, Qatar, the overall 
illiteracy rate was 18.8 per cent in 2000, the gap between men and women 
being less than three percentual points at 16.9 and 19.6 per cent, respectively. 
The poorer, but with a longer tradition of stable educational policy, Middle 
Eastern state of Jordan limited illiteracy rate to 10 per cent. Iraq had been 
heading this way prior to the two decades of intermittent warfare from 1990 
to 2011. Now the illiteracy rate skyrocketed to 61 per cent in Iraq or more than 
that in impoverished Mauritania where 60 per cent of the inhabitants cannot 
read or write. Undoubtedly, the Syrian civil war which erupted in 2011 further 
worsened the illiteracy rate which was around 20 per cent in 2010. Apparently, 
in the most populous Arab state of Egypt, 45 per cent of people were illiterate 
in 2000 (Literacy 2003: 12). In 2011, the overall illiteracy rate of the Arab states 
stood at 33 per cent. The situation was only slightly better than in the sub-
Saharan Africa where the illiteracy rate is 41 per cent (Huebler and Lu 2013: 
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8). Obviously, the main difficulty is the expectation that Arab children who 
are only fluent in a spoken (vernacular) Arabic would learn efficiently from 
textbooks written in the (as yet) unknown to them, (“foreign”) language of 
standard Arabic. Some educators who recognize this difficulty often make 
matters worse by writing textbooks in ad hoc “simplified” or “modernized” 
versions of standard Arabic, thus confusing pupils even more (Haeri 2009: 429)
However, it appears that even in an Arab (Arabicphone) state where high rates 
of formal literacy in standard Arabic are achieved, books in Arabic language 
are not used more widely. Something is lacking. Perhaps, the gap that exists 
between standard Arabic and the local vernacular forbids most Arabs with an 
average command of this “antique-holy-modern” language of standard Arabic 
from enjoying fiction. Khaled Al Khamissi’s 2006 novel Taxi is composed 
of stories narrated by Cairo taxi drivers. Memorably, it is the first-ever novel 
written (almost) entirely in the Egyptian vernacular, the speech of the Egyptian 
capital’s common people. It is so because the author lets the taxi drivers speak 
in their own voices. Dialogs and plays are the preserve of vernaculars in Arabic 
literature, among others, pushing writers of fiction to mix creatively standard 
and vernacular Arabic (Mejdell 2006). Resultant “mixed styles” bring to 
mind the Russian polymath Mikhail Lomonosov’s mid-18th-century plan for 
the development of the Russian language, which was to be composed of three 
“styles.” These styles differed in how they combined official Church Slavonic (or 
the language of the 9th–10th-century Slavic translation of the Bible) and Moscow’s 
Slavic vernacular. Official and “serious” texts and genres were to employ the 
“high style” or mostly Church Slavonic. The “low style,” or predominantly the 
vernacular, was to be used for writing plays, Church Slavonic limited to the 
stage directions. On the other hand, narrative poetry and fiction were to be 
written in the “middle style” or an equitable mixture of Church Slavonic and 
the vernacular. At the turn of the 19th century, the historian and writer Nikolai 
Karamzin limited this tripartite division to the middle style only. Subsequently, 
in the 1820s and 1830s, Russian romantic poets, led by Alexander Pushkin, 
thank their highly popular poetry and fiction, which made the middle style into 
what is now known as the Russian language (Stacy 1974: 16, 25-26).
It appears that nowadays there are only two “styles” of this kind in Arabic, 
namely “high” (standard Arabic) and “low.” The “high style” is used for any 
written purposes, apart from dialogs and plays which are commonly rendered 
in the “low style” of vernaculars (cf Miler 2017: 92).6 Perhaps, in the wake 
6 An interesting anthology of texts in Egyptian Arabic from the 15th century through the turn of the 
21st century is offered by Doss and Davies (2013). However, writing and publishing in a vernacular 
became a clear trend only in the 19th century (cf Rosenbaum 2011).
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of the Arab Spring, with the widespread use of social media, now a “middle 
style” is in making (cf Kindt and Kebede 2017; Mejdell 2006; Miler 2017: 
108). While a successful Arabic novel sells in about 3,000 copies in Egypt 
with the population of 90 million inhabitants, as many as 75,000 copies 
of the aforementioned book Taxi were snapped up (Haeri 2009: 424; Taxi 
2017). It means that switching from standard Arabic to the vernacular for 
writing novels could potentially increase the consumption of Arabic-language 
fiction over twenty-fold in the Arabic-speaking states. But neither writers nor 
publishers subscribe to this idea (Mlynxqualey 2010). It could easily lead to 
a religiously underpinned political backlash, violence, and riots, similar to 
those in 1901 in Athens when the Gospel of St Matthew was published in 
Demotic. The Arab world’s narrow highly educated and affluent class would 
not risk it. Only members of this class received enough schooling to master 
standard Arabic to such a high level that they are able to derive pleasure from 
the perusal of belles-lettres. This option is not available to the less-educated 
and poorer masses. Hence, reading Arabic novels as a popular pastime does 
not exist in the Arab countries. It is an elitist activity (Khidayer 2017; Morrow 
2016: 65-64; Qualey 2017).
For the poor and uneducated masses, the only possibility to acquire a 
vernacular of modernity which is both a language of books and popular 
television is through immersion in a speech community of such a language. 
Obviously, in the face of the pronounced absence of any standard Arabic 
speech community, this language is unable to offer such an option. In the 
case of the Arabicphone world, the short list of versatile modern languages 
is limited to English and French, or in other words, it is limited to the 
languages of the former imperial masters of the numerous erstwhile colonies 
in Northern Africa and the Middle East. In the westernmost corner of the 
Maghreb, in Western Sahara at present under Moroccan occupation, the role 
is also played by Spanish. Poorer Arabs achieve a degree of fluency in French, 
English, or Spanish by watching western (satellite) television since early 
childhood, learning a western language at school and most typically by going 
to Europe or North America for work. Their social betters achieve the same 
through attending private international schools in which English or French is 
the language of instruction, and foreign-medium universities either abroad or 
in the Persian Gulf states. Oftentimes, their parents speak English or French 
at home apart from an Arabic vernacular (Jaafari 2016).
The best and largest secular-style bookshops can be found in the Egyptian 
capital of Cairo and in Lebanon, the country being the center of book 
production in the Arab world since the 19th century. But in such a bookshop, 
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Arabic books typically add up to no more than one-fifth of the entire stock 
on offer (cf Rowell 2016; Soweid 2015). Among them the pride of the place 
is obviously reserved for lavishly produced copies of the Quran and other 
religious books, making secular Arabic novels into poor relatives. This is not 
surprising, given the elevated role of standard Arabic as the holy language 
of the Quran and Islam. The majority of Arabs do not distinguish between 
the Classical Arabic of this holy book and the supposedly “secular” Modern 
Standard Arabic of non-religious publications. However, they notice obvious 
differences such as ossified usages in Classical Arabic and terms for modern 
inventions (such as trains or television) in Modern Standard Arabic that 
do not occur in the Quran, but construe of these two varieties as stylistic 
registers of the same uniform language of Arabic (cf Blau 1981: 150; Brustad 
2015: 21-22; Quranic 2017; Van Mol 2003: 38). Additionally, the heightened 
symbolic value of the Arabic language prevents writers from tackling subjects 
and themes, seen by religious authorities as unworthy of expressing with the 
use of this holy language and its equally sacred script. And if some transgress, 
the argument of religiously underpinned morality (sharia) allows the powers 
to silence such voices through censorship and repression. Hence, novels in 
Arabic rarely transcend social and other boundaries. By remaining within the 
narrow circle of religiously defined decorum, many Arabic novels may appear 
rather boring to the western-minded Arabic reader, always in search of novelty 
and broader horizons (cf Massad 2007: 227-228; Mlynxqualey 2011; Oweidat 
and Schneider 2009). Recently, the situation started changing, especially in 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, where in the wake of the Arab Spring, some 
daring fiction has been published on topics ranging from sex to satire to 
political fiction (Jacquemond 2016: 360-366; Qualey 2015).
To tastes not satisfied by Arabic-language publications, the rest of the stock 
in a secular Lebanese bookstore caters. Usually, four-fifths of the books 
on the shelves are in French and English. The restrictions imposed by the 
religious authorities and Islamic pieties do not extend to publications in 
western languages. It would be interesting to run a poll in order to establish 
whether an average educated Arab reads more secular publications in such 
foreign languages or in Arabic. If the situation remains unchanged, western 
languages may soon join the constellation of the Arabic diglossia. In this 
context, the role of the vernacular would remain unchanged, but the use of 
standard Arabic would be limited to religion, politics, state administration, 
and formal schooling. On the other hand, French, English, or Spanish would 
become the “book languages” of the Arab world. Fiction and non-specialist 
non-fiction would be perused and written in these western “book languages,” 
rather than in standard Arabic. Obviously, the internet may become a game 
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changer, over 40 per cent Arabic-speakers now enjoying some access to the 
web (Arabic Speaking 2017; Haeri 2009: 429).
But as yet, no net movement of any “game-changing” significance emerged, 
which would encourage writing in vernaculars. Most agree that printed 
publications should be brought out in standard Arabic, with only one-third 
and one-fifth of respondents agreeing that Facebook and blogs, respectively, 
could be written in vernacular (Kindt and Kebede 2017: 29-30). It is 
interesting to observe the tightly controlled revival of the use of the Amazigh 
(Berber) language(s), especially in Morocco. However, Arabic speakers do 
not see Amazigh as part of the Arabic language. On the other hand, this 
aforementioned revival seems to be tactical, coldly calculated, in the wake 
of the Arab Spring of 2010–2012, to buy some legitimacy to the Moroccan 
authorities among the most marginalized sections of society in the country’s 
north. The same is largely true of lukewarm moves to improve the situation 
of Amazigh speakers in Algeria and Libya (Hoffman 2007: 209; Kumar 
2012; Sitou 2015). Till date there is no Amazigh language Wikipedia, which 
nowadays is the basic yardstick of a language’s presence in the cyberspace. The 
only exception to this continued shunning of vernaculars in the Arab countries 
is the founding of the vernacular Egyptian Arabic (Masry7) Wikipedia in 
2008. The development of this Masry Wikipedia serendipitously happened 
to coincide with the Arab Spring. It still grows, despite strong normative 
criticism that popularly sees Arabic dialects as unworthy of writing; while 
on the other hand, this view also claims that there can be only one Arabic 
language (Egyptian Arabic Wikipedia 2017; Panovic 2010; Proposals 
2014). The Egyptian Arabic Wikipedia with 17,300 articles under its belt 
is substantially smaller than the Arabic Wikipedia with over half a million 
articles. However, the former is still over six times bigger than the Maltese 
Wikipedia with merely 3,200 articles (List of Wikipedias 2017).
Thus, for better or worse, the emerging triglossia (ternary polyglossia) of 
standard Arabic, vernaculars, and a western language (Kindt and Kebede 20-
17: 24) seems to be replicated in the Arab(ic) section of the cyberspace (Miller 
2017: 98). The web is constructed and maintained by users who express their 
views, opinions, and attitudes in this new medium. Thus, their decisions 
and actions in the cyberspace quite closely reflect the social, political, and 
economic relations in which they function in the “real” (social, physical, 
material) world, that is, located outside the internet (Berger 2002; Hambuch 
2016).
7 Masry, or more exactly Maṣri, means ‘Egyptian.’ This adjective is derived from the Arabic name of 
Egypt, or Miṣr in standard Arabic and Maṣr in Egyptian Arabic (Egyptian Arabic 2017).
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Conclusion: From Chinese to Latin
The divergence between the vernaculars and standard Arabic is significantly 
smaller in the Arab world than in China between standard Chinese 
(Mandarin) and the Chinese dialects. Arab vernaculars are as different from 
one another as Germanic languages. German and English are different, but 
not radically so. A certain level of mutually comprehensible communication is 
possible between German and English speakers, without the need of gaining a 
command of each other’s languages. The same is true of Spanish- and Italian-
speakers in the case of Romance languages. On the other hand, some Chinese 
dialects are radically different from each other, for instance, like German 
differing from Spanish or Polish from English. No mutually comprehensible 
verbal communication is possible. However, this serious gap is bridged with 
the help of the morphemic Chinese script, which maps language at the level 
of morphemes (simple words). To some extent, speakers of various Chinese 
dialects can read the same text, but they pronounce it in radically different 
ways. When read out aloud by speakers of different Chinese dialects, this 
text becomes incomprehensible to one another, but the written text allows for 
successful communication at the level of writing (Rovira Esteva 2010: 227-
239). On the contrary, Arabs use a phonemic script, which is a consonantry 
(abjad) or a kind of “alphabet” with no letters for representing vowels. Children 
learn how to read Arabic with the help of special diacritical marks that put 
in vowels where they should be pronounced (A Textbook 2013; McGuinness 
1997: 60). However, the difference between standard Arabic and the 
vernaculars includes not only vowels but also vocabulary and syntax. Thus, an 
Arabic vernacular when jotted down in Arabic letters looks as different from 
standard Arabic on the printed page as in conversation (Hudson 1996: 50).
Unlike Arabic, there is no religion to keep standard Chinese and its dialects 
together. This role is fulfilled by the three millennia of the continuous tradition 
of Chinese imperial statehood. It is the longest in the world, and the Chinese 
script and language are this tradition’s foundations. Until the beginning of 
the 20th century, Classical Chinese was official in China. The situation was 
similar to that in the Arab world. Classical Chinese was codified at the 
turn of the third century; hence, it was removed from the vernacular for 17 
centuries, that is till the early 20th century. However, between the 14th and 19th 
centuries, a parallel literacy developed in the vernaculars of various Chinese 
capitals, before finally settling on the dialect of Beijing. In the Republic 
of China proclaimed in 1912, the balance started changing in favor of the 
Beijing vernacular, which was finally promulgated as the country’s official 
language in 1932. Communist China founded in 1949 upheld this decision 
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(Liang 2015: 18; Rovira Esteva 2010: 111-115). Obviously, when Classical 
Chinese was official, Chinese speakers had no speech community to fall back 
on if they wanted to master this language. But with the promulgation of the 
Beijing dialect in the role of the Chinese language, such a speech community 
sprang into life.
The existence of a speech community of China’s official language constitutes 
the main difference between this country and the Arab world in respect of 
language use. In the 21st century world, Arabic speakers are unique in upholding 
their official language as a written variety with no speech community. This 
shows clearly that humans can organize their linguistic arrangements in a 
myriad of starkly differing ways. None can be identified as the “correct” one 
to be followed by all. However, the Arab solution tends to be pushing Arabic 
speakers to embrace a western language as an indispensable addition to the 
traditional Arabic diglossia of standard Arabic and the vernaculars. Standard 
Arabic seems to be lacking in giving its users access to certain written aspects 
of modernity, such as popular fiction. But modernity as practiced in the 
Arab states may as well dispense with the perusal of fiction as a popular 
pastime. Modernity without belles-lettres is a clear possibility, perhaps even 
the dominating norm from the perspective of the entire globe. On the other 
hand, there is nothing inherent in standard Arabic that prevents it from 
becoming an everyday vernacular of a speech community, if a decision to 
this end is taken and followed through with necessary funding and expertise. 
Likewise, nothing stands in the way of teaching all Arabs standard Arabic to 
such a degree that they would be able to enjoy fiction written in this distinctly 
non-vernacular language.
What matters is choices made by Arabs themselves. For time being, however, 
no one seems to be interested in changing the sociolinguistic status quo 
as it obtains nowadays across the Arab world. No movement similar to 
the early 20th-century Hebrew-based Zionism aspires to make a somewhat 
vernacularized and reformed standard Arabic into a language of everyday 
life with its own speech community. What is more, the majority of the Arab 
states are not interested in securing necessary outlays on education that 
would enable teaching all Arabs standard Arabic to such a level of literacy as 
achieved in the case of vernacular languages in Europe. Obviously, it takes less 
time, effort, and investment to ensure an appropriately high level of literacy 
in a vernacular language (be it French, English, or German) than in a non-
vernacular language with no speech community to its proverbial “soul.”
The Arab world’s situation of diglossia appears to be the closest to that which 
persisted in Western Europe prior to the Reformation and the Counter-
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Reformation in the 16th century. Latin was then the official language of France, 
Spain, Portugal, or of the plethora of polities in the Apennine Peninsula (or 
today’s Italy). This holy language of the early fifth-century translation of the 
Catholic Bible retained its elevated role as (almost) the sole written official 
language in Christian Western Europe for a millennium. In the Romance-
speaking area, around the eighth or ninth century, distinct vernaculars began 
emerging from the late Latin cultural and linguistic commonality, namely, 
languages now identified as Catalonian, French, Galician, Italian, Portuguese, 
Romanian, or Spanish. Had Latin been preserved as the holy-cum-official 
language to this day in Italy, France, Portugal, Romania, or Spain, such a 
development would have almost perfectly reflected the sociolinguistic situation 
as it obtains now in the Arab world. We would have spoken of a “Latin world,” 
whose inhabitants – “Latins” – would have spoken the Latin language. Of 
course, some 12 to 15 centuries after the disappearance of any identifiable 
Latin speech community, in reality, such hypothetical Latins would have 
spoken regional vernaculars in everyday life, although they would have written 
in the Latin of the fifth-century translation of the Catholic Bible. They would 
have mastered this antique Latin at school and would have written and read 
publications in it to the exclusion of the entirely oral vernaculars. There would 
have been no French language, like at present there is no Egyptian language. 
Well, people would have spoken in French, but would have written only in 
Latin, thinking that both are one language, namely, Latin.
One may opine that this hypothetical comparison is flawed, because 
modernity arrived in Western Europe after Latin was decommissioned as the 
official language. But let us not forget about Central Europe, where Latin 
persisted in this role until the late 18th century in the Habsburg hereditary 
lands, and quite uniquely until 1844 in the Kingdom of Hungary, or today’s 
Hungary, Slovakia, northern and western Croatia, northwestern Romania, 
and westernmost Austria. Modernity – meaning education, technology, 
medicine, mass book production, newspapers, novels, and popular magazines 
– entered this region through the medium of Latin (Almási and Šubarić 
2015). With the rare exception of Romanians, none of the vernaculars used in 
the Kingdom of Hungary was of a Romance character. The Slavic vernaculars 
of Croatian, Ruthenian, and Slovak were as different from the German or 
Hungarian vernaculars as Chinese dialects from one another. From this 
perspective, the situation was different from what we can observe in the Arab 
world, namely, all Arabic vernaculars are Semitic and more similar to one 
another than their Chinese counterparts.
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Full-scale functional modern literacy in Latin was ensured by the complete 
Latin-medium educational system from elementary schools to universities. 
The Society of Jesus established this system in Central Europe in the wake 
of the highly successful Counter-Reformation. It catered to almost all nobles’ 
sons and some richer burghers’ sons (Bobková-Valentová 2006). By default, 
nobles’ daughters were excluded from attending school, alongside all peasant 
children. A total of 2–4 per cent of all children received such Latin-based 
education, but still a smaller number of them achieved such a high level of 
literacy that they were able to enjoy reading novels and volumes on technology 
and travels in this antique language. Nevertheless, quite a few Latin-educated 
literati continued to compose books in Latin, but simultaneously translated 
them into vernaculars (mainly German and Hungarian) in order to reach a 
wider audience and thus generate a bigger profit for their intellectual effort. In 
this manner, vernaculars were codified into languages and soon eclipsed Latin 
(Frank-Brandovska 1995: 33-34). The Latin commonality of Central Europe 
and of the Kingdom of Hungary was irrevocably lost (Hay 1978: 18).
Every change allows for gaining something new and unprecedented, which 
invariably must be paid for by the loss of an important element of tradition. 
Dante Alghieri wrote all his “serious books” in Latin, but nowadays he is 
remembered for his vernacular poetry in the dialect of Florence. This 
Florentine or Tuscan vernacular became a fully recognized Italian language 
in the wake of the founding of Italy as an ethnolinguistic nation-state in 
1861. In the early 14th century, Dante wrote a small book in Latin, titled 
De vulgari eloquentia, or “On Eloquence in the Vernacular.” He proposed 
that (Romance) vernaculars should be accorded more dignity as languages of 
everyday life and that they could be employed for writing poetry. The poet 
noticed that (Romance) vernaculars were not much different from Latin, but 
opined that more people would be able to enjoy books written in vernaculars 
than in Latin (Dante 1996).
On the horizon, there is no Arab poet or authority equal in stature to Dante, 
who would stand for an Arab vernacular, be it Cairene, Egyptian, Moroccan, 
or Lebanese (although the trend to write fiction in Egyptian Arabic began 
in the 1990s and gained a considerable momentum after the Arab Spring 
[Jacquemond 2016: 358-359]). But language politics in the Arab world does 
not need to follow the rut travelled in Europe. A triglossia also sounds like 
a good idea, which the European Union of 24 official languages could also 
usefully consider.
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